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Abstract—Resource constrained Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices are
highly likely to be compromised by attackers because strong security
protections may not be suitable to be deployed. This requires an alterna-
tive approach to protect vulnerable components in IoT networks. In this
paper, we propose an integrated defense technique to achieve intrusion
prevention by leveraging cyberdeception (i.e., a decoy system) and
moving target defense (i.e., network topology shuffling). We verify the
effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed technique analytically based
on a graphical security model in a software defined networking (SDN)-
based IoT network. We develop four strategies (i.e., fixed/random
and adaptive/hybrid) to address “when” to perform network topology
shuffling and three strategies (i.e., genetic algorithm/decoy attack path-
based optimization/random) to address “how” to perform network
topology shuffling on a decoy-populated IoT network, and analyze
which strategy can best achieve a system goal such as prolonging the
system lifetime, maximizing deception effectiveness, maximizing service
availability, or minimizing defense cost. Our results demonstrate that a
software defined IoT network running our intrusion prevention technique
at the optimal parameter setting prolongs system lifetime, increases
attack complexity of compromising critical nodes, and maintains superior
service availability compared with a counterpart IoT network without
running our intrusion prevention technique. Further, when given a single
goal or a multi-objective goal (e.g., maximizing the system lifetime and
service availability while minimizing the defense cost) as input, the best
combination of “when” and “how” strategies is identified for executing
our proposed technique under which the specified goal can be best
achieved.
1 Introduction
Internet-of-Things (IoT) has received significant attention
due to their enormous advantages. Advances in IoT tech-
nologies can be easily leveraged to maximize effective service
provisions to users. However, due to the high heterogeneity
and resource constraints of composed entities in a large-scale
network, we face the following challenges [1]: (1) distributed
technologies for communications, data filtering, processing,
and dissemination with various forms of data (e.g., text,
voice, haptics, image, video) in a large-scale IoT network with
heterogeneous entities (i.e., devices, humans); (2) severely
restricted resources in battery, computation, communication
(e.g., bandwidth), and storage, causing significant challenges
in resource allocation and data processing capabilities; (3)
highly adversarial environments with compromised, deceptive
entities and data, which may result in detrimental impacts
on the capabilities of critical mission-related decision making;
and (4) highly dynamic interactions between individual enti-
ties, data, and environmental factors (e.g., network topology
or resource availability), where each factor itself is also highly
dynamic in time/space. Due to these characteristics of IoT
environments, highly secure, lightweight defense mechanisms
are in need to protect and defend the system (or network)
against potential attacks. As a solution to protect and defend
a system against inside attacks, many intrusion detection sys-
tems (IDSs) have been developed to identify and react to the
attacks. However, the core idea of IDSs is reactive in nature
and even though it detects intrusions which have already been
in the system. Hence, this reactive mechanism normally would
be late and ineffective reacting to actions by agile and smart
attackers. To overcome the inherent limitation of IDSs due
to this reactive nature, intrusion prevention systems (IPSs)
have been developed to thwart potential attackers and/or
mitigate the impact of the intrusions before they penetrate
the system [2]. In this work, we are interested in developing
an integrated intrusion prevention mechanism based on cy-
berdeception (i.e., a decoy system) and moving target defense
(MTD) and evaluating their effectiveness and efficiency by a
graphical security model (GSM)-based evaluation framework
in a Software Defined Networking (SDN)-based IoT network
via simulation.
1.1 Research Goal & Contributions
This work proposes an integrated proactive defense system
based on cyberdeception and moving target defense (MTD)
techniques as intrusion preventive mechanisms to minimize
the impact of potential attackers trying to penetrate into
IoT systems via multiple entries. This work has the following
unique contributions relative to the current state-of-the-art:
• We are the first to propose an integrated proactive de-
fense system by shuffling the topology of an IoT network
consisting of both decoy nodes and real nodes. As decoy
nodes are part of a decoy system, this work integrates
MTD with cyberdeception to create maximum hurdles
and/or complexity to the attackers while minimizing the
defense cost for executing MTD operations. The key goal
of the proposed network topology shuffling-based MTD
technique (called NTS-MTD henceforward) with decoy
nodes is to generate a network topology that can maxi-
mize disadvantages against the attackers by misleading
attackers to spend time and energy on decoy nodes.
There is no prior research in the literature that considers
integrating cyberdeception and MTD particularly in the
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2context of network topology shuffling of decoy-populated
IoT networks.
• We address the issues of “when” to perform network
topology shuffling and “how” to perform network topol-
ogy shuffling on a decoy-populated IoT network. We
develop four strategies (fixed/random/adaptive/hybrid)
to address “when” to perform network topology shuf-
fling and three strategies (genetic algorithm/decoy attack
path-based optimization/random) to address “how” to
perform network topology shuffling and analyze which
strategy can best achieve a system goal such as pro-
longing the system lifetime, maximizing deception effec-
tiveness, maximizing service availability, or minimizing
defense cost. Further, when given a single goal (e.g.,
prolonging the system lifetime) or a multi-objective goal
(e.g., maximizing the system lifetime and service avail-
ability while minimizing the defense cost) as input, the
best combination of “when” and “how” strategies is iden-
tified for executing our proposed technique under which
the specified goal can be best achieved.
• We develop a graphical security model (GSM) to evaluate
the proposed cyberdeception and MTD technique. The
GSM offers design solutions to consider attack graphs
(AGs) and/or attack trees (ATs) which can provide ef-
ficient methods to calculate the potential security (or
vulnerability) levels of attack paths. This allows us to
analytically evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
cyberdeception and MTD integrated technique in a large
IoT network.
• We consider a Software Defined Networking (SDN)-based
IoT system as our network environment. The merits of
SDN technology are programmability and controllability,
allowing us to develop cyberdeception and MTD inte-
grated technique over a wide range of conditions. We
obtain security and performance measures, including the
number of attack paths toward decoy targets, mean time
to security failure (i.e., MTTSF or system lifetime), and
defense cost.
A preliminary version of this work appeared in [3]. We
have substantially extended [3] in algorithm design and
evaluation, including:
• We develop a new “when-to-shuffle” strategy based on
adaptive shuffling and we consider four “when-to-shuffle”
triggering strategies, viz., fixed, random, adaptive, and
hybrid.
• We develop a new “how-to-shuffle” strategy based on
decoy attack path-based optimization for maximizing the
number of attack paths toward decoy targets and we
consider three “how-to-shuffle” strategies, viz., genetic
algorithm, decoy attack path-based optimization, and
random.
• We consider a new metric, packet delivery ratio, to mea-
sure the service availability in the presence of attacks.
• We conduct a comparative performance analysis for 12
schemes resulting from a combination of four “when-to-
shuffle” triggering strategies and three “how-to-shuffle”
strategies. We add a new section to analyze the effects
of key parameters, including attack intelligence, attack
severity, and decoy/real node population, on system per-
formance. We also add a new section to analyze the sen-
sitivity of performance results with respect to the system
security vulnerability level threshold parameter and the
maximum delay parameter used in hybrid shuffling.
1.2 Structure of This Paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides a brief overview of the related work in terms of
MTD and cyberdeception techniques for IoT environments,
security models and metrics, and SDN technology and its
use for IoT environments. Section 3 gives an overview of the
system model, including the targeted network environment,
node characteristics, attack behaviors, defense mechanisms,
and security failure conditions. Section 4 describes the design
of our proposed integrated proactive defense mechanism in
detail, including the strategies of when and how-to-shuffle
an IoT network populated with real and decoy nodes to
achieve performance goals and the graphical security model
used for security analysis. Section 5 shows evaluation results
and analyzes the results observed. Section 6 summarizes key
findings and suggests future research directions.
2 Related Work
We briefly survey related work in three areas: (1) existing
MTD and cyberdeception techniques for IoT; (2) security
models and metrics; and (3) SDN technology for IoT.
2.1 MTD and Defensive Deception Techniques for IoT
The concept of moving target defense (MTD) has been
emerged to support the goal of proactive intrusion prevention.
The basic idea behind MTD is to defense against attackers by
continuously changing attack surface (e.g., system/network
configurations) so as to increase attack complexity/cost and
also invalidate the system intelligence collected by the attack-
ers [4], [5]. MTD has been discussed with three main classes:
shuffling, diversity, and redundancy. Shuffling-based MTD
aims to confuse attackers by changing network/system config-
urations such as network addresses (e.g., IP addresses, MAC
addresses, or port numbers), software migration, or network
topology configuration. Diversity-based MTD increases attack
complexity by using various types of system components
(e.g., software) which provide same functionalities (e.g., using
different kinds of operating systems). Lastly, Redundancy-
based MTD provides security protections by dynamically us-
ing multiple replicas of system components in a network for
the purpose of maintaining high system reliability [4].
Several existing MTD techniques have been developed to
provide security protection for resource-constrained IoT envi-
ronments. [6] investigated address space layout randomization
(ASLR) and evaluated its performance using the proposed
Hierarchical Attack Representation Model (HARM). Several
lightweight MTD techniques are also proposed by randomly
choosing different types of cryptographic primitives [7] or both
cryptosystems and firmwares [8] for wireless sensor networks.
[9] proposed a dynamically changing IPv6 address assignment
approach over the IoT devices using Low-Powered Wireless
Personal Area Networks (LPWPANs) protocol to defend
against various network attacks. [10] extended the work in [9]
by presenting a design based on address rotation to obscure
the communications among IoT devices. However, [9], [10] do
3not have any experimental validation of the design. [11] de-
veloped an MTD security framework based on context-aware
code partitioning and code diversification for IoT devices to
obfuscate the attackers.
[10] and [12] developed micro MTD IPv6 as a solution to
provide privacy and defense services to resource constrained
devices. This work limited the time available to an attacker
performing reconnaissance attacks and provided power con-
sumption analysis to prove the efficacy of their micro MTD
mechanism. [13] proposed an MTD technique to provide
anonymization of packet flow for IoT devices. They looked
into privacy issues caused by tracking and communication-
flow identification in current low power solutions. They pro-
posed micro One Time Address that changes the structure
of IPv4 packets and verifies a single address being used only
for transmission of one packet. However, the change of IP
header requires re-configuring all the routers. [14] set their
goals to provide a lightweight solution to change the addresses
of IoT devices. They proposed an MTD solution called HMAC
(AShA) performing address shuffling network-wide. A mul-
ticast message is sent and the proposed mechanism allows
for the devices to recompute their addresses. [15] proposed a
self-configuring fog architecture to provide security and trust.
The proposed MTD technique moves applications inside a fog
network by using live migrations; however, the overhead of
live migrations was not considered in their work.
[16] proposed a game theoretic zero-determinant approach
for MTD in IoT to minimize extra operations required by
Markov gaming while dominating the game based on a
Zero-Determinant (ZD) strategy. [17] proposed a model that
prevents attackers from discovering device addresses in IoT
networks. Their MTD technique was designed to preserve
privacy while transmitting data via a dedicated MTD channel.
[18] proposed security function virtualization MTD to protect
SDN enabled smart grid from resource exhaustion attacks.
The proposed MTD migrates virtual security functions upon
changes in traffic states. To minimize the total migration time,
they formulated a migration problem as an optimization prob-
lem under the scenarios with different network constraints.
[19] proposed an honeypot-like MTD management framework
(called HIoT) to secure an IoT network by deceiving attackers.
HIoT uses cell phones around an IoT device to dynamically
project these cell phones as fake gateways, real gateways, and
sensors. They also created real and fake sub-nets to carry real
and fake data. Similarly, [20] proposed an MTD mechanism
against side channel attacks. They presented a method to
calculate the interval required for encryption re-keying after
collecting a minimum number of trace leakages so as to reduce
computation overhead.
Defensive deception techniques provide proactive defense
services by adding an extra layer of defense on top of tra-
ditional security solutions (e.g., Intrusion Detection System,
or IDS, firewalls, or endpoint anti-virus software) [21]. [22]
introduced a game theoretic method to model the interaction
between an attacker who can deceive a defender with suspi-
cious or seemingly normal traffic and a defender in honeypot-
enabled IoT networks. [23] used honeypots for online servers
to mitigate Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
launched from IoT devices. [24] created a ZigBee honeypot to
capture attacks and used it to identify the DDoS attacks and
bot malware. However, none of the works cited above [23],
[24], [22], [21] analyzed the impact of deception techniques
on system-level security. Also, none of the works cited above
considered the tradeoff between defense cost vs. system-level
security for an IoT system which allows distributed decoy
deployment to achieve adequate coverage and provide cost-
effective defense service [25]. [2] investigated an integrated
defense system to identify what components of each defense
mechanism can provide the best solution for ‘defense in
breadth’ considering both enhanced security and defense cost.
However, their work is based on model-based analysis without
empirical verification.
All the works cited above focused on either cyberdeception
or MTD. There is no current work on developing an integrated
defense system equipped with both MTD and defensive decep-
tion techniques. Relative to the works cited above, we propose
an integrated proactive defense based on cyberdeception and
MTD techniques as intrusion preventive mechanisms that
can effectively and efficiently mitigate the adverse effect of
attackers before the attackers penetrate a target IoT system.
2.2 Security Models and Metrics
Graphical security models, including attack graphs (AGs) [26]
and attack trees (ATs) [27], have been widely employed for
security analysis in various types of networks. An attack graph
(AG) shows all possible sequences of the attacker actions that
eventually reach the target. As the network size increases,
the size of an AG can grow exponentially, thus limiting
its applicability. An attack tree (AT) is a tree with nodes
representing the attacks and the root representing the goal
of attacks. It systematically presents potential attacks in the
network. However, AT is also not scalable with the growth of
network size.
In order to address the scalablity issue, a two-layer Hi-
erarchical Attack Representation Model (HARM) was intro-
duced in [5] by combining various graphical security models
onto different layers. In a two-layer HARM, the upper layer
captures the network reachability information and the lower
layer represents the vulnerability information of each node
in the network. The layers of the HARM can be constructed
independently of each other. This decreases the computa-
tional complexity of calculating and evaluating the HARM
compared with that of the existing single-layered graphical
security models. [6], [5] investigated the effectiveness of de-
fense mechanisms based on HARM. In [6], a framework was
developed to automate security analysis of an IoT system
by which HARM is used to assess the effectiveness of both
device-level and network-level defense mechanisms based on
various performance metrics such as attack cost and attack
impact. In [5], MTD techniques were evaluated in a virtualized
system based on HARM using a risk metric. However, three
different MTD techniques, including shuffling, diversity and
redundancy, were separately evaluated without considering
an integrated defense system. Relative to the works cited
above, we also leverage HARM as our graphical security model
since it scales with large IoT systems. However unlike the
cited works above, we develop a HARM model specifically for
security analysis of our proposed integrated defense system
using both cyberdeception and MTD techniques.
In the literature, a risk-based security model has also been
used to assess the effectiveness of defense mechanisms [28],
4[29], [30]. [28] proposed a risk-based security framework for
IoT environments in the eHealth domain to measure expected
risk and/or potential benefits by taking a game theoretic
approach and context-aware techniques. [30] proposed an
adaptive security management scheme considering security
metrics (e.g., metrics representing authentication effective-
ness, authorization metrics) to deal with the challenges in
eHealth IoT environments. However, only high-level ideas
about the metrics were described without taking into account
key characteristics of IoT environments that would require
lightweight solutions. [29] proposed a method to come up
with the optimal security resource allocation plan for an
IoT network consisting of mobile nodes using a risk metric
estimated by reflecting an economic perspective. However,
only device-level evaluations were considered without showing
system-level evaluations. Relative to works cited above, we do
not adopt a risk-based security model for assessing defense
mechanisms. Rather, we develop a scalable lightweight HARM
model to evaluate the deployment of an integrated defense
mechanism for an IoT environment by meeting both system
security and performance requirements.
2.3 SDN Technology for IoT
Software defined networking (SDN) is a promising technology
to flexibly manage complex networks. In the SDN-based archi-
tecture, the control logic is decoupled from the switches and
routers and implemented in a logically centralized controller;
the controller communicates with the data forwarding devices
via the southbound application programming interface (API)
and provides the programmability of network applications
using the northbound API. OpenFlow (OF) is the most widely
used southbound API which provides the specifications for
the implementation of OF switches (including the OF ports,
tables, channels, and protocols) [31]. Some SDN solutions are
applied to IoT networks for data flow control among IoT
devices [32], data exchange reduction in wireless sensor net-
works [33], wireless access networks [34], mobile networks [35],
smart urban sensing [36], and topology reconfiguration deci-
sion making in wireless sensor networks [37]. Unlike the above
cited works, our work considers a general IoT network with the
support of SDN functionality for network topology shuffling
where an IoT network consists of both decoy nodes and real
nodes.
3 System Model
In this section, we discuss our system model, including (1)
the network model in an IoT environment with the support
of SDN technology; (2) the attack model describing the at-
tacker’s capabilities and attack goals considered in this work;
and (3) the defense model addressing defense mechanisms
deployed in the given network.
3.1 Network Model
In this work, we consider an IoT network (e.g., a smart
hospital) which consists of servers and IoT nodes. IoT nodes
collect data and periodically deliver them to servers via single
or multiple hops for further processing. IoT nodes of different
functionalities and servers are placed in different Virtual Local
Area Networks (VLANs) in the given network. We assume
SDN technology [32], [33], [38], [34] is applied to the IoT net-
work in order to effectively and efficiently manage and control
nodes. We consider one SDN controller to be deployed in a
remote server. The SDN controller communicates with SDN
switches and manages flows between IoT nodes and servers
which are connected to switches. Users from the Internet can
request services from the servers and will not interact with IoT
nodes directly. We will further detail the network scenario in
our case study in Section 5.1.
3.2 Node Model
We characterize a node’s attributes by four aspects: (1)
whether a node is compromised or not (i.e., ni.c = 1 for
compromised; ni.c = 0 otherwise); (2) whether a node is a real
node or a decoy (i.e., ni.d = 1 for a decoy; ni.d = 0 for a real
node); (3) whether a node is a critical node with confidential
information that should not be leaked out to unauthorized
entities (i.e., ni.r = 1 for a critical node; ni.r = 0 otherwise);
and (4) a list of vulnerabilities that a node is vulnerable
to (i.e., ni.v = {v1, ..., vm} where m is the total number of
vulnerabilities). Hence, node i’s attributes are represented by:
Ani = [ni.c, ni.d, ni.r, ni.v]. (1)
3.3 Attack Model
In this work, we consider the following attacks that may lead
to breaching system security goals:
• Reconnaissance attacks: Outside attackers are able to
perform scanning attacks to identify vulnerable targets
(e.g., a server) and then break into a system (or a
network). The success of this attack demonstrates the
successful identification and compromise of vulnerable
targets by the outside attacker and leads to the loss of
system integrity. This is related to triggering the system
failure based on the security failure condition 1 (SFC1) in
Section 3.5.
• Data exfiltration attacks: Inside, legitimate attackers are
able to use credentials (e.g., login credentials or a legit-
imate key to access resources) obtained from a compro-
mised node to leak confidential information to unautho-
rized, outside entities. The success of this attack results
in the leakage of confidential information to unauthorized
parties and leads to the loss of confidentiality. This is
related to triggering the system failure based on the
security failure condition 2 (SFC2) in Section 3.5.
We make the following assumptions on attack behav-
iors and goals to characterize attackers:
• An attacker is assumed to have limited knowledge on
whether a given node is decoy (i.e., a fake node mimicking
a real node) or not. The attacker’s capability to detect
the deception depends on the knowledge gap between the
attacker and the real system state (i.e., how effectively
the deployed decoy system mimics the real system in a
sophisticated manner). We characterize the level of an
attacker’s intelligence in detecting a decoy node by the
degree (or probability) at which the attacker interacts
with the decoy node, as described in Section 3.4.
• An attacker’s behavior is monitored after interacting with
a decoy. If the attacker realizes the existence of a decoy, it
5terminates interactions with the decoy immediately and
attempts to find a new target to break into the system.
• An attacker’s ultimate goal is to compromise servers
to leak confidential information to unauthorized entities
outside the IoT network.
• An attacker is capable of identifying and compromising
unpatched exploitable vulnerabilities or unknown vulner-
abilities in a given IoT network.
• An attacker is highly unlikely to compromise servers di-
rectly as each server is assumed to have strong protection
mechanisms. Therefore, the attacker can exploit vulnera-
ble IoT nodes as entry points, move laterally within the
network after the exploitation, and eventually compro-
mise servers by identifying and exploiting unpatched or
unknown vulnerabilities.
• The SDN controller is assumed to be well-protected
where communications between the SDN controller and
SDN switches are secure [38].
3.4 Defense Model
We assume traditional defense mechanisms are in place in
the IoT network, including a network-based IDS, firewalls,
and anti-virus software on servers. The IDS is capable of
monitoring the whole IoT network and creates alerts on
detected intrusions for incident responses. This work focuses
on two types of intrusion prevention mechanisms, namely,
cyberdeception and MTD, to divert attackers from real IoT
nodes and dynamically change the attack surface to increase
attack complexity.
3.4.1 Decoy System as Defensive Deception
A defender (i.e., system) can defensively deceive attackers
with the purpose of luring them into a decoy system and inter-
acting with them to capture and analyze malicious behaviors
and reveal intentions/strategies. The decoy system is deployed
independently from the real system. Accordingly, we assume
that normal, legitimate users are not aware of the existence of
the decoy system while the defender will receive alerts caused
by the malicious intrusions if an attacker breaks into the decoy
system. We consider two types of decoys utilized throughout
an IoT network in this work:
1) Emulation-based decoys: This type of decoys allows
defenders to create a variety of fake assets and to provide
a large-scale coverage across the network.
2) Full OS-based decoys: This type of decoys enables the
replication of actual operating system and software run-
ning on production devices to increase the engagement
possibility of the attacker.
Both emulation-based and full OS-based decoys can be au-
tonomously created to fit within the environment with-
out changing the existing infrastructure. To increase overall
chances of exploiting decoys by attackers, a combination of
diverse forms of decoys with various interactive capabilities
can be created to resemble legitimate nodes. There exists
an intelligence center performing the following tasks: (1)
create, deploy, and update a distributed decoy system; (2)
provide automated attack analysis, vulnerability assessment,
and forensic reporting; and (3) integrate the decoy system
with other prevention systems (e.g., security incident and
event management platform, firewalls) to block attackers. The
module for the decoy node deployment can be implemented
and placed in a remote server.
We create a design parameter, Pd, indicating the prob-
ability that an attacker interacts with a decoy node. To be
specific, we consider P emd as the probability that an attacker
interacts with an emulation-based decoy and P osd as the
probability that an attacker interacts with a full OS-based
decoy (P emd ≤ P osd as full-OS-based decoys are considered as
having more sophisticated services with more cost).
3.4.2 Network Topology Shuffling-based MTD
We consider Network Topology Shuffling-based MTD (NTS-
MTD) to change the topology of a given IoT network. NTS-
MTD is to be triggered following the concept of event-based
MTD in that the network topology changes upon the occur-
rence of an event. We assume that the SDN controller can
control and change flows among nodes in an SDN-based IoT
system. We combine cyberdeception and NTS-MTD by means
of network topology shuffling to change the attack surface of
the IoT network populated with both real and decoy nodes.
The details of the proposed decoy system and the event-based
NTS-MTD will be described in Section 4.
3.5 Security Failure Conditions
A system fails when either of following two conditions is
satisfied:
• Security Failure Condition 1 (SFC1): This system
failure is closely related to the attacker’s successful re-
connaissance attacks and accordingly their successful
compromise of system components. We define this system
failure based on the concept of Byzantine Failure [38].
That is, when more than one third of legitimate nodes are
compromised, the system fails due to the loss of system
integrity.
• Security Failure Condition 2 (SFC2): This system
failure occurs when confidential information is leaked out
to unauthorized entities by inside attackers (or compro-
mised nodes), which perform data exfiltration attacks.
Th system fails due to the loss of data confidentiality.
4 Proposed Proactive Defense Mechanisms
In this section, we describe our proposed NTS-MTD technique
in three main aspects: (1) when to perform network topology
shuffling with decoy nodes; (2) how to perform topology
network shuffling with decoy nodes; and (3) graphical security
model for security analysis.
4.1 When to Perform Network Topology Shuffling with
Decoy Nodes
In this section, we describe the initial deployment of decoy
nodes in an IoT network and when to perform network
topology shuffling with decoy nodes.
4.1.1 Deployment of Decoy Nodes
Both server and IoT nodes are deployed in the IoT network.
As the network is divided into different virtual local area
networks (VLANs), we place IoT decoy nodes into each VLAN
based on the deployment of real nodes in the corresponding
VLAN. At least one decoy server needs to be deployed to
6interact with the attacker and reveal the attacker’s intent.
Note that we can deploy more decoys if the VLAN has a large
number of real nodes with different types. When adding decoy
nodes, we connect real IoT nodes with decoy nodes to lure
attackers into the decoy system. The SDN controller controls
flows from real IoT nodes to decoy nodes or from decoy nodes
to decoy nodes, and also from real IoT nodes to real IoT nodes.
There will be no flows from decoy nodes to real nodes as decoy
nodes are used to divert attackers from the real system; once
the attacker is lured into the decoy system, it will be diverted
to other decoys within the decoy system and the behavior
will be monitored; if the attacker detects a decoy node, it will
terminate the interaction with the decoy node and look for
a new target to break in. Directional flows between real and
decoy nodes may reveal some information to attackers in the
long term. In this work, We consider changing flows from real
nodes to both real and decoy nodes to increase the complexity
of connection changes.
Updated flows (either addition or removal) may affect
normal flows from IoT nodes to servers for service delivery.
In practice, IoT nodes will consume more energy to deliver
more flows and may delay the time to send normal packets
toward the server. We use packet delivery ratio as a metric for
measuring service availability, as discussed in Section 5.2.
Initially we create decoy nodes with added connections to
some randomly chosen real nodes based on the deployment of
real nodes in each VLAN. The randomly generated network
topology will be used as the initial topology and then fed into
the shuffling optimization algorithm to identify an optimal
network topology.
4.1.2 When to Shuffle Network Topology
We can use a fixed time interval to execute NTS-MTD.
Apparently the fixed time interval is the most important
parameter of this strategy because if the interval is too short,
the defense cost will be high although the system lifetime
may be prolonged because frequent topology shuffling can
mislead the attacker to decoy paths and nodes and thus keep
real nodes from the attacker. On the other hand if the fixed
time interval is too long, it will adversely shorten the system
lifetime because of infrequent network shuffling. We call this
strategy the fixed time interval strategy or just “fixed” for
short. A variation of this “fixed” strategy is to have the time
interval follow a distribution with the mean being the same as
the fixed time interval used by the fixed strategy. This will add
some stochastic nature to the time interval which is treated as
a random variable. We will call this strategy “random” for
short.
Alternatively, we can execute NTS-MTD when a condition
is detected true, for example, based on the system security
vulnerability level detected by the system. We will call this
strategy “adapative” for short. To be specific, the system
security vulnerability level at time t, denoted by SSV (t), is
measured by two dimensions: (1) how many legitimate, inside
nodes are compromised until time t, which is associated with
SFC1; and (2) how many neighboring nodes of a critical node
(i.e., ni.r = 1) within k hops from the critical node i are
compromised until time t, which is related to SFC2. Of course
we do not know which node is actually compromised unless the
IDS has detected it. However, given the list of vulnerabilities
that a node is vulnerable to, as discussed in Section 3.2 and the
compromise rate for each vulnerability which is documented
in several sources such as [39] we can estimate the probability
that a node is compromised at time t. Note that when the
system meets either SFC1 or SFC2, the system fails, leading to
SSV (t) = 1. Otherwise, SSV (t) is computed by:
SSV (t) = w1
CN(t)
N
+ w2
CNck(t)
Nck(t)
(2)
Here w1 and w2 are weights to consider SFC1 and SFC2,
respectively, where w1 +w2 = 1. N is the total number of real
nodes which is known at deployment time and CN(t) is the
number of compromised, real nodes at time t which may be
estimated from the compromise rate of each vulnerability that
a node is vulnerable to. (See more about this in Section 5.1.)
Nck(t) is the total number of real nodes within k hops from
given critical nodes at time t which may be obtained from
the topology shuffled at time t while CNck(t) is the total
number of compromised, real nodes within k hops from critical
nodes which again can be estimated from the compromise
rate of each vulnerability that a node is vulnerable to. Since
there may be multiple critical nodes which have confidential
information that should not be leaked to outside unauthorized
parties, we estimate CNck(t) by:
CNck(t) =
∑
i∈Lk(t)
ni.c(t) (3)
where Lk(t) is the number of real nodes that belong to
neighbors of any critical nodes within k hops from them at
time t and ni.c(t) refers to whether node i is compromised
(ni.c(t) = 1) or not (ni.c(t) = 0) at time t. The cardinality
of Lk(t) (i.e., |Lk(t)|) yields Nck(t). Note that as the network
topology keeps changing due to the execution of NTS-MTD,
both Nck(t) and CNck(t) are functions of time to reflect
their dynamic changes. If Lk(t) includes any critical nodes
being compromised, the system meets SFC2 and fails. That is,
SSV (t) = 1 and no further detection of system security level
is needed.
Lastly we can have a hybrid strategy that will degenerate
to the adaptive strategy when the triggering time as deter-
mined by the adaptive strategy is smaller than the fixed time
interval used by the fixed strategy and will degenerate to the
fixed strategy otherwise.
The four “when-to-shuffle” strategies will be more formally
defined and labeled later in Section 5.3 when we perform
evaluation.
4.2 How to Shuffle Network Topology with Decoy Nodes
We develop three strategies to address how to perform net-
work shuffling when it is time to execute NTS-MTD. The
basic idea of our design is to maximize the chance of the
attacker exploiting decoy targets, thus effectively deterring
or preventing its security attacks to real nodes. In order to
reach a target node, an attacker could exploit a node as an
entry point and use it as the stepping stone to compromise
other nodes and further compromise the target. It may be
able to find multiple attack paths via one or multiple entry
points. An attack path describes a sequence of nodes that
an attacker could compromise to reach the target node. We
consider a set of attack paths AP for an attacker to reach all
targets from all possible entry points. Each attack path ap is
7a sequence of nodes along the path. We use APr to represent
a set of attack paths with real nodes as targets and APd to
denote a set of attack paths with decoy nodes as targets. APr
only contains real nodes while APd contains both real and
decoy nodes. To be specific, if an attacker finds a real node
as the entry point and compromises other real nodes until
reaching a real target node, this is counted as an attack path
in APr; however, it could be diverted to a decoy node. Once
the attacker is lured into the decoy system, it will be diverted
to other decoy nodes within the decoy system. If the attacker
reaches a decoy target node, this is counted as an attack path
inAPd; however, if the attacker figures out the decoy node and
terminates its interaction, it is not counted as an attack path
because the attacker does not reach the decoy target node.
Besides, decoy nodes could be updated or cleared once it is
detected compromised by the intelligence center in which case
the attacker will not recognize the same decoy node during
subsequent attacks.
To maximize the chance of the attacker being misled to
decoy targets, we develop the following two “how-to-shuffle”
strategies:
• GA-based optimization: We design three metrics to
be optimized in the algorithm: (1) The number of attack
paths toward the decoy targets (NAPDT ); (2) Mean Time
To Security Failure (MTTSF); and (3) Defense cost
(CD). Computations of these metrics are described in
Section 5.2.
• Decoy path-based optimization: Due to the high
computational complexity of GA, we design a simple
heuristic algorithm to provide a close-to optimal solu-
tion in topology shuffling. The algorithm takes a path-
based optimization approach in two ways: (i) Shuffle
edges (connections) from real IoT nodes to decoy nodes
to randomize decoy connections; and (ii) Shuffle edges
(connections) among real IoT nodes to maximize the
number of attack paths toward decoy targets.
The third strategy is a baseline strategy that generates
a network topology based on a connection probability of
a real/decoy node being connected to another decoy node.
We call this strategy “random” meaning that the connection
probability is a random variable in the range of [0, 1] which
determines if a connection from a real/decoy node to another
decoy node should be created in the resulting topology.
The three “how-to-shuffle” strategies will be more formally
defined and labeled later in Section 5.3 when we perform
evaluation.
4.3 Graphical Security Model for Security Analysis of
NTS-MTD
We develop a graphical security model based on HARM to
assess the security of an IoT network.
Fig. 1 describes the workflow of our security analysis in
five phases: network generation, topology generation, security
model generation, shuffling mechanism evaluation, and shuf-
fling optimization.
1) Phase 1: The security decision maker provides the IoT
Generator with the system information (i.e., an initial
network topology and node vulnerability) to construct
an IoT network.
2) Phase 2: Given the network and initial deployment of
decoys, the Topology Generator randomly generates a
set of different topologies for GA-based shuffling and
one topology for decoy path-based shuffling (i.e., add
connections from real nodes to decoys/real nodes).
3) Phase 3: The Security Model Generator takes the
shuffled network as input and automatically generates
a HARM model that captures all possible attack paths.
We use a three-layer HARM as our graphical security
model, with the upper layer capturing the subnet reacha-
bility information, the middle layer representing the node
connectivity information (i.e., nodes connected in the
topological structure), and the lower layer denoting the
vulnerability information of each node.
4) Phase 4: The Shuffling Evaluator takes the HARM
model as input along with evaluation metrics and com-
putes results which are then fed into the Optimization
Module.
5) Phase 5: For GA-based shuffling, based on the initial set
of shuffled topologies and associated evaluation results,
the Optimization Module applies the multi-objective
GA to compute the optimal topology for the IoT net-
work. For decoy path-based shuffling, the Optimization
Module takes the randomly shuffled topology from the
Topology Generator and runs the heuristic algorithm
to compute the close-to optimal topology.
5 Numerical Results & Analysis
In this section, we first describe the simulation setup, per-
formance metrics used for performance analysis, parameter
table, implementation detail, and data collection process.
Then we conduct a comparative performance analysis of 12
schemes of when and how to execute our proposed NTS-MTD
technique.
5.1 Simulation Setup
We use an IoT network shown in Fig. 2 in our simulation
and assume SDN is deployed to support connection changes.
We consider a smart hospital scenario in the IoT context.
Specifically, the network consists of four VLANs. There are
two Internet of Medical Things (i.e., MRI and CT Scan) in
VLAN1 (e.g., medical examination rooms), a smart thermo-
stat, a smart meter, and a smart camera in VLAN2 (e.g.,
medical care units), a smart TV and a laptop in VLAN3 (e.g.,
staff office) and a server located in VLAN4 (e.g., server room).
At the initial deployment, VLAN4 is connected with other
three VLANs as IoT devices need to deliver information to
the server for further processing. VLAN2 is also connected
to VLAN3 for applications running on the laptop to control
smart sensors as well as receive videos from the smart camera.
We collect software vulnerabilities from Common Vul-
nerabilities and Exposures (CVE)/National Vulnerability
Database (NVD) [39]. We assume each real node has one
vulnerability that could be exploited by the attacker to gain a
root privilege. More vulnerabilities could be chosen for nodes
in the future work. This research work focuses on proposing
and evaluating the integrated proactive defense mechanism,
rather than demonstrating capabilities of the graphical secu-
rity model to analyze the security posture of the IoT network
with multiple vulnerabilities. The vulnerability information
8Fig. 1: Workflow for the security analysis.
TABLE 1: Real node and vulnerability information.
Real Node VLAN CVE ID Compromise Rate
MRI VLAN1 CVE-2018-8308 0.006
CT Scan VLAN1 CVE-2018-8308 0.006
Smart Thermostat VLAN2 CVE-2018-11315 0.006
Smart Meter VLAN2 CVE-2017-9944 0.042
Smart Camera VLAN2 CVE-2018-10660 0.042
Smart TV VLAN3 CVE-2018-4094 0.012
Laptop VLAN3 CVE-2018-8345 0.004
Server VLAN4 CVE-2018-8273 0.006
TABLE 2: Decoy Node and Vulnerability Information.
Decoy Node VLAN CVE ID Compromise Rate
CT Scan VLAN1 CVE-2018-8308 0.006
CVE-2018-8136 0.012
Smart Camera VLAN2
CVE-2018-6294 0.042
CVE-2018-6295 0.042
CVE-2018-6297 0.042
Smart TV VLAN3 CVE-2018-4094 0.012
CVE-2018-4095 0.012
Server VLAN4
CVE-2016-1930 0.042
CVE-2016-1935 0.012
CVE-2016-1962 0.042
Fig. 2: A software-defined IoT network.
of real nodes (i.e., CVE ID) is presented in Table 1. We also
assume the compromise rate of each vulnerability. The com-
promise rate represents the frequency that an attacker could
successfully exploit the vulnerability to gain root privilege per
time unit (i.e., hour). We estimate the value according to the
base score from the Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS). Specifically, we estimate the compromise rate as once
per day (i.e., 0.042) if the base score is 10.0, twice per week
(i.e., 0.012) if the base score of is around 8.0, once per week
(i.e., 0.006) if the score is around 7.0, and once per 10 days
(i.e., 0.004) if the score is around 5.0. This value will be used
to calculate Mean Time to Compromise (MTTC) and Mean
Time to Security Failure (MTTSF) by the HARM model.
Once a node is compromised it can perform packet dropping or
manipulating attacks to affect service availability. In practice,
however, a compromised node may not drop or manipulate
a packet passing through it, so it won’t get caught by the
network IDS. In our simulation, we consider a packet drop
probability P da and a packet manipulation probability Pma by
the attacker.
We put one decoy node in each VLAN in the initial
deployment of the decoy system. In order to lure attackers,
9each decoy is assumed to be configured to have multiple
vulnerabilities. An attacker could exploit any vulnerability
to gain the root permission of the node. The vulnerability
information of decoys is listed in Table 2. We use emulated
decoys for the CT scan, smart camera, smart TV, and full-OS
based server.
5.2 Metrics
We use the following metrics to measure security, perfor-
mance, and service availability of the proposed proactive
defense mechanisms:
• Number of attack paths toward decoy targets
(NAPDN ): This metric indicates the level of deception that
diverts an attacker from the real system. NAPDN is cal-
culated by |APd| to sum attack paths toward the decoy
targets.
• Mean Time To Compromise (MTTC): This metric
refers to the total amount of time that an attacker takes
to compromise a series of nodes within the network until
the system reaches a certain security vulnerability level
SSV . MTTC is estimated by:
MTTC =
∑
i∈S
Si
∫ ∞
t=0
Pi(t)dt (4)
where S refers to a set of all system states and Si is 1
when in state i the system does not reach the given SSV
level and is 0 otherwise. Pi(t) is the probability of the
system being in state i at time t.
• Mean Time To Security Failure (MTTSF): This
metric measures the system lifetime indicating how long
the system prolongs until the system reaches either SFC1
or SFC2 (described in Section 3.5). That is, MTTSF mea-
sures the system lifetime without occurring any security
failure. MTTSF is measured by:
MTTSF =
∑
i∈S
(1− SFi)
∫ ∞
t=0
Pi(t)dt (5)
where S is a set of all system states and SFi returns
1 when system state i reaches either SFC1 or SFC2; 0
otherwise. Pi(t) indicates the probability of the system
being in state i at time t.
• Defense Cost (CD): This metric depicts the cost as-
sociated with shuffling operations. That is, we count
the number of edges shuffled (i.e., from connected to
disconnected or from disconnected to connected) by:
CD =
∫ MTTSF
t=0
CS(t) (6)
where CS(t) refers to the number of shuffled edges at
time t. Note that the same edge can be shuffled multiple
times over time and each shuffling is counted as a separate
MTD operation during the system uptime.
• Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): This metric measures
service availability affected by topology shuffling. Be-
cause of topology shuffling, attackers tend to compromise
nodes on attack paths. For each attack path in APr,
a compromised node along the path may drop or ma-
nipulate packets travelling through it, thereby affecting
service availability for service packets passing through the
attack path. If packets are not dropped or manipulated by
compromised nodes along the path (because the attacker
may not want to get caught by the IDS) or if there is no
compromised node along the attack path, then the path
will be able to successfully deliver service packets. At each
shuffling operation, we count the number of attack paths
that can successfully do packet delivery and divide it by
the total number of attack paths |APr|. When the system
reaches either SFC1 or SFC2, we calculate the mean PDR
over all shuffling operations.
5.3 Twelve Schemes to Execute NTS-MTD based on
When and How Strategies
We investigate two aspects of NTS-MTD: (i) when-to-shuffle
a network topology (in an interval or in an adaptive manner);
and (ii) how to select a network topology (by a GA-based
optimization, a decoy path-based optimization, or random
shuffling).
Four strategies regarding when-to-shuffle a network
topology are:
• Fixed Shuffling (FS): This strategy is to execute NTS-
MTD in a fixed time interval, γ1, to shuffle the network
topology.
• Random Shuffling (RS): This strategy is to execute
NTS-MTD in a random interval based on exponential
distribution with mean λ.
• Adaptive Shuffling (AS): This strategy is to execute
NTS-MTD in an adaptive manner based on SSV (t) with
two given thresholds: (1) β to check the decrease of the
SSV during a checking interval ∆; and (2) ρ to check
the current system security vulnerability, SSV (t), as
described in Section 4.1. NTS-MTD is executed when the
condition, (SSV (t)− SSV (t−∆) > β) ∧ (SSV (t) > ρ),
is true. This condition is checked whenever the system
detects a compromised real node, thus reflecting the
nature of an event-driven adaptive MTD.
• Hybrid Shuffling (HS): This strategy is a mixture of
AS and FS. Since AS triggers the execution of NTS-
MTD until the event condition is detected, it may delay
the execution of NTS-MTD unnecessarily especially in
the beginning because security vulnerability does not
necessarily increase rapidly in the beginning. To rem-
edy this, we introduce an upper bound time limit (i.e.,
the maximum delay) for NTS-MTD execution. Specifi-
cally, the time interval to execute NTS-MTD is set to
min[Int(AS), γ2] where Int(AS) returns a time interval
when AS is used and γ2 is the fixed time interval for the
maximum delay when FS is used.
Three strategies regarding how to select a network
topology are:
• Random Network Topology (RNT): This strategy is
a baseline strategy that selects a network topology based
on a rewiring probability Pr of a node being connected
with another node. Here Pr is critical in determining the
overall network density in a given network.
• GA-based Network Topology (GANT): This strat-
egy selects a network topology that maximizes objective
functions used in the GA, as discussed in Section 4.1.
• Decoy Path-optimized Network Topology
(DPNT): This strategy selects a network topology
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that maximizes the number of decoy paths for each real
IoT node, as discussed in Section 4.1.
Since we have four “when” strategies and three “how”
strategies for NTS-MTD execution, there are 12 schemes
resulting from the combination of one “when” strategy and
one “how” strategy, viz., FS-RNT (i.e., execution of NTS-
MTD based on Fixed Shuffling (FS) and Random Network
Topology (RNT)), RS-RNT, AS-RNT, HS-RNT, FS-GANT,
RS-GANT, AS-GANT, HS-GANT, FS-DPNT, RS-DPNT,
AS-DPNT, and HS-DPNT.
5.4 Parameter Table, Implementation Detail, and Data
Collection Process
Table 3 summarizes the model parameters, their meanings,
and default values used in our simulation runs.
Our proposed NTS-MTD technique is implemented based
on the workflow shown in Fig. 1. The Optimization Module
implements the algorithms to execute the three “how” strate-
gies, i.e., RNT, GANT, and DPNT, as discussed in Sec-
tion 5.3.
We assume there is an attacker exploiting node vulner-
abilities. In each simulation run, the attacker will randomly
choose entry points and compromise nodes along the attack
paths with behaviors defined in Section 3.3 until either SFC1
or SFC2 (see Section 3.5) is met. We assume that the system
will clear decoy nodes once it detects the attacker’s inter-
action with the decoy target. Therefore, the attacker will
not recognize the same decoy node in its subsequent action.
Decoy nodes are also cleared at each shuffling. By using
FS/RS strategies, the network may be shuffled periodically
or randomly right at the moment a node is under attack. We
assume that the attacker is forced to quit the network due
to lost connections and needs to find other ways to break
into the network. In the subsequent attack after shuffling,
the attacker could continue its previous attack action once it
encounters the same real node next time (i.e., MTTC for the
real node is accumulated throughout the MTTSF). By using
the AS strategy, the network is shuffled due to changes to SSV
being detected by the defender. The attacker is also forced to
quit the network after each shuffling due to lost connections
and needs to find ways to re-enter the network. Each newly
shuffled network is modeled by a HARMmodel for calculating
potential attack paths. The attacker’s intelligence, estimated
by P emd and POSd (see Section 3.4), is incorporated into the
calculation of MTTSF as well as MTTC. We encode each
shuffling solution for the whole network as a binary valued
vector with 1 representing the existence of an edge between
two nodes and 0 representing no edge. We limit potential
connections to be edges from real IoT nodes to either decoy
nodes or real IoT nodes. Hence, to optimize the defense cost,
we aim to maximize CT (t) − CD(t) where CT (t) refers to the
total defense cost (i.e., the total number of potential edge
changes at time t) and CD(t) is the number of edges changed
by executing NTS-MTD at time t (see Section 5.2).
For GANT, we aim to solve a multi-objective optimization
(MOO) problem with three objectives to maximize NAPDN and
MTTSF while minimizing CD (or maximizing CT (t)−CD(t)).
The optimization problem is to compute a set of Pareto opti-
mal solutions (or Pareto frontier) [40]. In order to choose one
optimal solution among the Pareto frontier, we first normalize
three metrics, denoted by N˜APDN , ˜MTTSF and, C˜D, and then
assign a weight to each metric based on scalarization-based
MOO technique to transform the MOO problem to a single-
objective optimization (SOO) problem [41]. The normalized
metric, X˜, is given by:
X˜ = X
Xmax
(7)
where X is the original metric value and Xmax is the maxi-
mum metric value of the corresponding fitness function in the
final population in the GA-based algorithm.
The objective function we aim to maximize is represented
by:
max wN N˜APDN + wM ˜MTTSF + wCC˜D (8)
where wN , wM , and wC are weights to the three metrics with
wN + wM + wC = 1. The optimal solution is the network
topology with the maximum objective value.
In each simulation run, we collect data to calculate the
mean time to security failure, MTTSF, the number of attack
paths toward decoy targets, NAPDT , the defense cost per time
unit, CD, and the packet delivery ratio, PDR. We run the
simulation 100 times using random seeds in each simulation.
After 100 simulation runs, we collect the means of MTTF,
NAPDT , CD, and PDR for performance analysis.
5.5 Comparative Performance Analysis
In this section, we conduct a comparative performance anal-
ysis of the 12 schemes discussed in Section 5.3. We follow the
parameter table in Table 3. We vary the level of attackers’
intelligence in detecting decoy nodes (i.e., P emd and P osd ),
attack severity (i.e., packet drop probability P da and packet
manipulation probability Pma ), the number of decoys in each
VLAN, and the number of real IoT nodes to analyze their
effects on performance in terms of the mean time to security
failure, MTTSF, the number of attack paths toward decoy
targets, NAPDT , the defense cost per time unit, CD, and the
packet delivery ratio, PDR.
5.5.1 Comparison of Schemes under the Baseline Scenario
We first consider a baseline scenario in which there is only
one decoy in each VLAN and the attacker intelligence is low
characterized by its high interaction probabilities with decoys,
i.e., P emd =0.9 for an emulated decoy and P osd =1.0 for a full-OS
based decoy. Recall that a high interaction probability means
that the attacker must interact with a decoy node intensively
in order to detect it is a decoy.
Fig. 3 compares the performance characteristics of the 12
schemes discussed in Section 5.3 for executing our proposed
NTS-MTD technique under the default parameters presented
in Table 3.
• Fig. 3a compares the number of attack paths toward de-
coy targets NAPDT (the higher the better) representing de-
ception effectiveness. In the “when-to-shuffle” category,
fixed/random shuffling (FS/RS) based schemes perform
comparably among themselves On the other hand, in the
“how-to-shuffle” category, the genetic algorithm network
topology (GANT) scheme performs the best in deception
effectiveness, followed by the decoy path-optimized net-
work topology (DPNT) scheme and the random network
topology (RNT) scheme. This indicates how-to-shuffle
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TABLE 3: Design parameters, their meanings and default values.
Param. Meaning Value
w1 A weight to consider the security vulnerability associated with SFC1 0.5
w2 A weight to consider the security vulnerability associated with SFC2 0.5
P emd Interaction probability of an attacker with an emulated decoy 0.9
P osd Interaction probability of an attacker with a full-OS based decoy 1.0
P da Probability of a packet to be dropped 0.5
Pma Probability of a packet to be manipulated 0.5
k Number of hops to determine a node’s ego network 1
N Total number of network topologies with initial decoy deployment and ran-
domly generated connections between real and decoy nodes used in GANT
100
wN A weight to consider in objective function used in GANT 1/3
wM A weight to consider in objective function used in GANT 1/3
wC A weight to consider in objective function used in GANT 1/3
Ng Maximum number of the generation used in GANT 100
rc Crossover rate used in GANT 0.8
rm Mutation rate used in GANT 0.2
Pr Probability of an edge being shuffled in RNT (i.e., add/remove an edge) 0.5
β Threshold used to estimate the decrease of the system security vulnerability
level during the time used in AS/HS
0.01
ρ Threshold of tolerating system security vulnerability used in AS/HS 0.1
γ1 Fixed shuffling time interval used in FS (hour) 24
γ2 Fixed shuffling time interval (maximum delay) used in HS (hour) 120
λ Mean value used for exponential distribution in RS (hour) 24
the network has a major impact on deception effective-
ness.
• Fig. 3b compares MTTSF (the higher the better) repre-
senting the system lifetime before the system experiences
a failure. In the “when-to-shuffle” category, fixed/random
shuffling (FS/RS) based schemes significantly outper-
form adaptive/hybrid shuffling (AS/HS) based schemes
in MTTSF. One factor is system failure in AS/HS is
determined by either SFC1 or SFC2 being triggered, or
SSV exceeding the threshold. In the current setting,
AS/HS uses a low SSV threshold (i.e., 0.1), which in-
dicates a low tolerance on SFC1 and SFC2. This means
system status could be considered as failure based on SSV
threshold before either SFC1 or SFC2 is triggered. Another
factor is that in FS/RS based schemes, a node may
be under attacks while the network is shuffled because
the fixed/random interval for topology shuffling could
be much smaller than the MTTC of the node at which
time topology shuffling is triggered by AS/HS. After each
shuffling, the attacker is forced to quit the network due
to lost connections and needs to re-enter the network by
randomly choosing entry points to compromise. After re-
entering, the attacker could continue its previous attack
once it encounters the same real node next time or launch
a new attack for a decoy node as decoys are cleared at
each shuffling. This could effectively lead to an increase
of MTTSF over time in order to meet either SFC1 or
SFC2 security failure condition. We see that RS produces
the highest MTTSF among all. In the “how-to-shuffle”
category, GANT and DPNT perform comparably among
themselves and both outperform RNT.
• Fig. 3c compares the defense cost CD (the lower the
better). Since the defense cost is inversely related to the
number of attack paths toward decoy targets (i.e., decep-
tion effectiveness), we expect the trend for defense cost is
just opposite to that in Fig. 3a for deception effectiveness.
This is indeed the case. In the “when-to-shuffle” cate-
gory, adaptive/hybrid shuffling (AS/HS) based schemes
perform comparably among themselves and outperform
fixed/random shuffling (FS/RS) based schemes, a trend
that is opposite to that for deception effectiveness. In
the “how-to-shuffle” category, DPNT performs the best
in defense cost among all, followed by GANT and RNT.
This is also a trend that is in line with that exhibited in
Fig. 3a for deception effectiveness. DPNT has the lowest
CD among all due to less edge changes made during
topology shuffling compared to GANT and RNT.
• Fig. 3d compares packet delivery ratio PDR (the higher
the better) representing service availability. In the “when-
to-shuffle” category, adaptive/hybrid shuffling (AS/HS)
based schemes perform comparably among themselves
and outperform fixed/random shuffling (FS/RS) based
schemes. The reason is that AS/HS produces a smaller
number of attack paths toward decoy targets than
FS/RS, so the attacker has a smaller chance to drop or
manipulate packets passing through the attack paths. In
the “how-to-shuffle” category, GANT, DPNT and RNT
perform comparably among themselves.
Summarizing above, there is no winner that can achieve
the goal of maximizing deception effectiveness (see Fig. 3a),
MTTSF (see Fig. 3b), and service availability (see Fig. 3d)
while minimizing defense cost (see Fig. 3c). However, we could
identify DPNT as the best “how-to-shuffle” strategy that can
maximize MTTSF and minimize defense cost, while maintain-
ing comparable service availability. We explore optimal pa-
rameters of DPNT-based schemes in Section 5.6 and compare
the IoT network with and without these DPNT-based schemes
in Section 5.7. We also note that RS performs better than FS
even the mean time interval for executing topology shuffling
in RS is the same as the fixed time interval for executing
topology shuffling in FS (see Table 3). We attribute this to the
fact that the execution time interval in RS follows exponential
distribution and this stochastic nature matches better with
the stochastic nature of attack behavior.
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Fig. 3: Comparison of schemes under the baseline scenario.
5.5.2 Analysis on Impact of Attacker’s Intelligence
We use the baseline scenario, except considering attackers
with different levels of intelligence. We consider three levels
of attack intelligence represented by three pairs of interaction
probabilities with decoys (P emd for an emulated decoy, P osd
for a full-OS based decoy): low intelligence (0.9, 1.0), medium
intelligence (0.5, 0.7) and high intelligence (0.1, 0.3). For other
design parameters, we follow their default values summarized
in Table 3. Without loss of generality, we consider AS-DPNT
and HS-DPNT to analyze the impact of attack intelligence.
Fig. 4 shows how AS-DPNT and HS-DPNT perform in
terms of the mean time to security failure, MTTSF, the
number of attack paths toward decoy targets, NAPDT , the
defense cost per time unit, CD, and the packet delivery ratio,
PDR. In Fig. 4a, with the decreasing attack intelligence,
NAPDT fluctuates for each scheme as this metric is related to
the shuffling algorithm (i.e., DPNT in this case study). In
Fig. 4b, for each scheme, MTTSF reaches the highest when
the attacker has low intelligence. This implies the potential
attacker with higher intelligence in detecting decoys hurts the
system lifetime as measured based on MTTSF. However, both
AS-DPNT and HS-DPNT are resilient under high-intelligent
attacks without much reduction of MTTSF compared with
the case of low-intelligent attacks. In Fig. 4c, CD has an
increasing trend for both schemes when intelligence increases.
In Fig. 4d, PDR remains at 1.0 for both schemes. One reason
is that in adaptive/hybrid shuffling, critical nodes may not
be compromised when the SSV threshold is small (e.g., ρ =
0.1). Even if some neighbor nodes are compromised, there are
still some clean neighbor nodes to be able to deliver packets.
Another reason is that in our simulation setting, P da = 0.5 and
Pma = 0 to avoid detection, so compromised nodes will only
drop half of the packets passing through them.
In summary, attack intelligence has a moderate degree of
impact (10-20%) on MTTSF and CD because high intelligent
attackers are capable of detecting decoys early on. This allows
them to have more interactions with real nodes early on,
thereby leading to shorter lifetime and forcing the system to
trigger costly shuffling operations to prevent security attacks.
Attack intelligence, however, has little impact on NAPDT and
PDR.
5.5.3 Analysis on Impact of Attack Severity on Service Avail-
ability
We use the baseline scenario, except considering attacks with
different levels of severity that would affect service availability.
We consider three levels of attack severity represented by
three pairs of packet drop probability P da and packet ma-
nipulation probability Pma : low severity (0.1, 0.1), medium
severity (0.5, 0.5) and high severity (1.0, 1.0). For other
design parameters, we follow their default values summarized
in Table 3. We again apply DPNT-based schemes to analyze
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Fig. 4: Performance analysis on impact of an attacker’s intelligence.
the impact of attack severity on packet delivery ratio (PDR)
representing service availability.
Low Medium High
Attack severity
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Av
er
ag
e 
pa
ck
et
 d
el
iv
er
y 
ra
tio
FS-DPNT
RS-DPNT
AS-DPNT
HS-DPNT
Fig. 5: Comparative performance analysis of the variants of
DPNT schemes under the different attack severity.
Fig. 5 shows the effect attack severity on PDR for DPNT
based schemes. We observe that PDR remains at 1.0 for AS-
DPNT and HS-DPNT while steadily decreases for FS-DPNT
and RS-DPNT as the attack severity increases. This demon-
strates resilience of adaptive shuffling schemes (i.e., AS/HS)
in response to increasing attack severity because critical nodes
are well protected from security attacks by setting a low SSV
threshold (e.g., ρ = 0.1).
5.5.4 Analysis on Impact of Decoy Node Population
We increase the number of decoy nodes in each VLAN to
analyze the impact of decoy node population. The baseline
scenario has (1, 1, 1, 1) decoy nodes for (MRI/CT scan,
smart thermostat/meter/camera, smart TV/laptop, server).
We consider two more scenarios: (2, 2, 2, 2) and (3, 3, 3, 3).
For other design parameters, we follow their default values
summarized in Table 3. We consider AS-DPNT and HS-
DPNT to analyze the impact of decoy population.
Fig. 6 shows how AS-DPNT and HS-DPNT perform in
terms of the mean time to security failure, MTTSF, the num-
ber of attack paths toward decoy targets, NAPDT , the defense
cost per time unit, CD, and the packet delivery ratio, PDR, as
the decoy population changes.
In Fig. 6a, NAPDT increases significantly with the increasing
number of decoys within each scheme. The reason is that
as the number of decoys increases, DPNT also increases the
number of attack paths toward decoy targets. In Fig. 6b,
MTTSF remains steady as the number of decoys increases.
We attribute this to the design of DPNT algorithm which only
focuses on maximizing the number of decoy paths. There may
be many paths with a majority of real IoT nodes on the paths.
Attackers could still be able to compromise a large portion of
real IoT nodes thus leading to system failure because MTTSF
is calculated based on compromised real nodes within the
network. In Fig. 6c, CD also increases as the number of decoys
increases. This is due to the fact that a lot of edges need
to be changed with additional decoy nodes. In Fig. 6d, PDR
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Fig. 6: Performance comparative analysis of the variants of DPNT schemes under different decoy deployment scenarios.
remains at 1.0 across all scenarios as PDR is related to service
availability among real nodes, so it is little affected by decoys
especially when SSV threshold is low (e.g., ρ = 0.1 in our test
case).
In summary, decoy node population has a great impact on
NAPDT and CD while it does not largely improve MTTSF or
PDR.
5.5.5 Analysis on Impact of Network Size (Real Node Popula-
tion)
We increase the number of real nodes in each VLAN to
analyze the impact of network size (or real node popula-
tion). The baseline scenario has (2, 3, 2, 1) real IoT nodes
for (MRI/CT scan, smart thermostat/meter/camera, smart
TV/laptop, server). We consider one more scenario: (2, 6, 4,
1) real IoT nodes. The number of medical devices in VLAN1
is kept the same as in the baseline scenario as they are rarely
deployed in a large scale due to their high price. Therefore,
we have two scenarios with the number of real IoT nodes
(excluding the server) as 7 and 12 respectively. We apply HS-
DPNT to analyze the impact of network size.
Table 4 shows the effect of network size on performance
in terms of the mean time to security failure, MTTSF, the
number of attack paths toward decoy targets, NAPDT , the
defense cost per time unit, CD, and the packet delivery ratio,
PDR. We see that NAPDT has a significant jump from 2734.5
to 6206452.0. As the number of real IoT nodes increases,
the number of decoy paths with real IoT nodes acting as
entry points and intermediate nodes also increases. Since more
decoy paths/edges are created as the number of real IoT nodes
increases, the defense cost CD doubles. MTTSF decreases
by 16.9% as the number of real IoT nodes increases. The
reason is that more real nodes introduce more attack surface
and as more real nodes are compromised the system failure
condition SFC1 specified in Section 3.5 can trigger a failure.
Lastly network size has little effect on PDR due to the same
reason explained earlier in Section 5.5.2.
In summary, network size (i.e., real node population) has
a high impact on NAPDT , CD, and MTTSF, but little impact on
PDR.
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of the performance
results with respect to the maximum delay parameter (γ2)
and the security vulnerability level (SSV) threshold parameter
(ρ) to identify the optimal parameter setting under which the
system performance can be maximized. These two parameters
are used in two “when-to-shuffle” strategies, namely, adaptive
shuffling and hybrid shuffling (AS/HS). Without loss of gen-
erality, we consider HS-DPNT in the sensitivity analysis since
earlier we have identified DPNT as the best “how-to-shuffle”
strategy that can maximize MTTSF and minimize defense
cost, while maintaining comparable service availability.
15
TABLE 4: Analysis on impact of network size.
Metric No. of real IoT nodes
7 12
NAPDT 2734.5 6206452.0
MTTSF 160.1 133.0
CD 0.23 0.53
PDR 1.0 1.0
5.6.1 Sensitivity Analysis of Maximum Delay
We use the baseline scenario in Section 5.5.1, except that
we vary the maximum delay parameter, γ2, when performing
hybrid shuffling. The reason we use a maximum delay is to
avoid the situation in which an incremental increase of SSV
does not reach the threshold, thus delaying the execution
of DPNT. We consider the following values for γ2 in the
sensitivity analysis: 48, 72, 96, 120, 144, 168 (hours). These
values are related to the scenario and could change due to
different scenarios. For other design parameters, we follow
their default values summarized in Table 3.
Fig. 7 shows the sensitivity of the performance results
in terms of NAPDT , MTTSF, CD, and PDR with respect to
the maximum delay parameter (γ2) in hybrid shuffling (HS).
Intuitively, a shorter delay may cause the network to be
shuffled more often which makes HS similar to fixed/random
shuffling (FS/RS) while a longer delay may delay shuffling
thus degenerating HS to adaptive shuffling (AS). In Fig 7a,
NAPDT fluctuates as the metric is related to how-to-shuffle
instead of when-to-shuffle. In Fig. 7b, MTTSF fluctuates
slightly from 48 to 120 with a local optimal value of 159
hours at 72, reaches the peak of 165 hours at 144 and then
drops to 127 hours at 168. In Fig. 7c, CD steadily decreases
as the maximum delay increases because topology shuffling
will occur less frequently as the maximum delay increases.
In Fig. 7d, PDR remains at 1.0. The reason is the same as
stated in Section 5.5.2. Summarizing above, if the goal is to
maximize MTTSF, setting the maximum delay at 144 could
be considered as optimal for HS-DPNT.
5.6.2 Sensitivity Analysis of the System Security Vulnerability
(SSV) Threshold
We use the baseline scenario in Section 5.5.1, except that we
vary the SSV threshold values, ρ, in the range of [0.1, 0.9] with
0.1 as the increment. For other design parameters, we follow
their default values summarized in Table 3. We again apply
HS-DPNT in our sensitivity analysis.
Fig. 8 shows the sensitivity of the performance results in
terms of NAPDT , MTTSF, CD, and PDR with respect to the
SSV threshold parameter ρ. In Fig. 8a, NAPDT fluctuates as
NAPDT is related to how-to-shuffle instead of when-to-shuffle.
In Fig. 8b, MTTSF jumps from 149 at 0.2 to 308 at 0.3,
slightly increases to 334 as the peak when ρ is 0.4, and then
varies between 308 and 328 when ρ increases. In Fig. 8c, CD
decreases to 0.15 when ρ increases to 0.3 and then stays stable
with increasing ρ. In Fig. 8d, PDR drops to 0.73 when ρ is 0.3
and stays stable afterwards. The reason is the same as stated
in Section 5.5.2. Summarizing above, if the goal is to maximize
MTTSF, setting the SSV threshold parameter at 0.4 could be
considered as optimal for HS-DPNT.
5.7 Performance Comparison of IoT Networks with vs.
without NTS-MTD Running
In this section, we compare the performance of IoT networks
with vs. without our proposed network topology shuffling-
based MTD (NTS-MTD) technique running. That is, the
baseline IoT network does not have decoy nodes deployed
and does not have our proposed network topology shuffling-
based MTD (NTS-MTD) technique running for intrusion
prevention. We use the same baseline scenario as before with
the same attack model applied. We collect performance data
for computing MTTSF and PDR based on 100 times of
simulation runs. We compare the baseline scheme with DPNT
based schemes running at optimal settings identified in the
sensitivity analysis study of Section 5.6 (i.e., FS-DPNT with
the optimal fixed interval at 72 hours, RS-DPNT with the op-
timal mean interval at 24 hours, AS-DPNT with the optimal
SSV threshold at 0.6, and HS-DPNT with the optimal SSV
threshold at 0.4). Fig. 9 shows the performance comparison
results in MTTSF and PDR over all DPNT based schemes
considered in this work. The baseline IoT system is labeled
with “No defense” in Fig. 9. We observe that all DPNT-
based schemes significantly outperform the counterpart base-
line IoT system. In particular, HS-DPNT has the highest
increase (26%) in MTTSF while FS-DPNT has the highest
increase (60%) in PDR. These results demonstrate that an
IoT network running our intrusion prevention technique at the
optimal parameter setting prolongs system lifetime, increases
attack complexity of compromising critical nodes (so that the
system lifetime is prolonged), and maintains superior service
availability compared with a counterpart baseline IoT network
without running our intrusion prevention technique.
6 Conclusions & Future Work
In this paper, we proposed an integrated proactive defense
mechanism by utilizing cyberdeception and network topology
shuffling and completed a comprehensive analysis via simula-
tion. We considered a smart hospital scenario within the IoT
context. The proposed approach could be applied to any IoT
environment.
From this study, we obtained the following key findings:
• In the “when-to-shuffle” category, adaptive/hybrid shuf-
fling (AS/HS) based schemes outperform fixed/random
shuffling (FS/RS) based schemes in defense cost. On the
contrary, FS/RS based schemes outperform AS/HS based
schemes in the average number of attack paths toward
decoy targets (i.e., deception effectiveness). Choices of
fixed/mean interval used by FS/RS and SSV threshold
used by AS/HS have significant impact on MTTSF and
service availability and need to be properly determined.
The analysis performed in this paper can help the system
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Fig. 7: Effect of the maximum delay (γ2) on the performance
of HS-DPNT (identified as the best scheme) under the base-
line scenario.
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threshold ρ on the performance of HS-DPNT (identified as
the best scheme) under the baseline scenario.
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Fig. 9: Performance Comparison of IoT Networks with vs.
without NTS-MTD Running.
designer determine the best interval by FS/RS and best
SSV threshold by AS/HS to maximize MTTSF.
• In the “how-to-shuffle” category, decoy path-optimized
network topology (DPNT) based schemes perform
comparably with genetic algorithm network topology
(GANT) based schemes in MTTSF (i.e., system lifetime)
and packet delivery ratio. On the other hand, DPNT
incurs less defense cost than GANT since GANT tends
to create more attack paths toward decoy targets (i.e.,
deception effectiveness). Both DPNT and GANT based
schemes outperform random network topology (RNT)
shuffling schemes in MTTSF and the number of attack
paths toward decoy targets (deception efficiency). Conse-
quently, if MTTSF is the goal, DPNT should be chosen
over GANT because it incurs less defense cost while
achieving comparable MTTSF.
• If maximizing MTTSF is the most important goal, while
maximizing deception effectiveness and service availabil-
ity and minimizing defense cost are sub-goals, HS-DPNT
with an optimal SSV threshold (with HS as the “when-
to-shuffle” strategy and DPNT as the “how-to-shuffle”
strategy) emerges as the best scheme among the 12
schemes investigated for executing our proposed NTS-
MTD technique because it can maximize MTTSF (even
the number of attack paths toward decoy targets gener-
ated by DPNT is low) and minimize defense cost, while
maintaining comparable service availability.
• Among the 12 schemes investigated for executing our pro-
posed NTS-MTD technique, AS-DPNT/HS-DPNT (with
AS/HS as the “when-to-shuffle” strategy and DPNT as
the “how-to-shuffle” strategy) can achieve high MTTSF
and deception effectiveness, while maintaining low de-
fense cost and high service availability. Further, AS-
DPNT/HS-DPNT are resilient against attackers with in-
creasing intelligence capability of detecting decoy nodes.
There exist an optimal setting for the system security vul-
nerability level threshold parameter and the maximum
delay parameter for maximizing MTTSF. The analysis
performed in this paper can help the system designer
identify the best parameter setting under which MTTSF
may be maximized.
• Real node population has a high impact on the number
of attack paths toward decoy targets, defense cost, and
MTTSF. On the other hand, although decoy node popu-
lation has a high impact on the number of attack paths
toward decoy targets and defense cost, it does not largely
improve MTTSF.
As our future work, we plan to explore the following
research areas:
• We will develop distributed MTD operations with decen-
tralized SDN controllers. To this end, we will develop cri-
teria to divide an IoT network into multiple sub-networks
which can be controlled by different SDN controllers with
the aim of providing lightweight shuffling-based MTD
solutions.
• We will explore machine/deep learning-based approaches
to compute an optimal network topology in network
shuffling-based MTD. As an example, we may consider
GNN to model complex relationships and learn informa-
tion structured as graphs [42].
• Wewill incorporate ML/DL-based network topology gen-
eration technology with the graphical security model
(GSM) to determine the optimal network topology by
reconstructing GSM and developing new security metrics
for solution optimization (e.g., the average number of
decoy nodes on an attack path).
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Appendix
In this appendix, we provide notations used in the optimiza-
tion algorithm in the following and then present the algorithm
in Algorithm 1.
• mi: A node in the network for i ∈ {1, ..., n} where n is the
total number of nodes
• M : A set of nodes in the network, denoted by M =
{m1, ...,mn}
• Md: A set of decoy nodes in the network, denoted by
Md = {md1 , . . . ,mdn}
• Mr: A set of real nodes in the network, denoted byMr =
{mr1 , . . . ,mrn}
• Mt: A set of nodes considered as targets, denoted by
Mt ⊂M
• Mdt: A set of decoy nodes considered as decoy targets,
denoted byMdt ⊂Mt
• emi,mj : An edge (connection) from mi to mj
• mi.con: A list of out-degree connections of mi
• getDecoys(M, ζ): A function that randomly selects a
certain number of decoy IoT nodes from all decoy IoT
nodes based on a probability ζ where each real IoT node
is connected to at least half of the decoy nodes; a returned
list is stored inMd.
• checkCon(mi,mj): Return true for emi,mj > 0; return
false otherwise
• c: A cost associated with shuffling edges which is incre-
mented by 1 upon any edge changed (i.e., removal or
addition)
• DPmi : A set of paths toward decoy targets where node
mi is an entry point
• traverseNet(M): A function that takes a set of nodes in
the network and returns DicM with node mi as the key
and |DPmi | as the item where mi is a real IoT node
• Max(DicM ): A function that returns a list of nodes with
maximum |DPmi |
• Min(DicM ): A function that returns a list of nodes with
minimum |DPmi |
In Algorithm 1, we explain what each line does as follows:
line 2: Go through each node in the network.
line 3: Check two conditions: (i) whether node mi is a
real node or not; and (ii) the node is a target or not.
line 4: If node mi is a real node and not a target (i.e., a
real IoT node), we randomly select a certain number of
decoy IoT nodes and store them inMd.
line 5: Go through each node in the network.
line 6: Check two conditions: (i) whether node mj be-
longs toMd or not; and (ii) whether the node is connected
with mi or not.
lines 7-8: Add an edge (connection) from mi to mj and
increment the cost by 1.
line 11: Go through each node in mi.con.
line 12: Check two conditions: (i) whether node mk
belongs toMd; and (ii) whether the node belongs toMdt
or not.
lines 13-14: Remove the existing connection from mi to
mk and increase the cost by 1.
Algorithm 1 Decoy Path-based Optimization Algorithm
1: procedure Decoy-Path-Optimization
2: for mi ∈M do
3: if mi ∈Mr ∧mi /∈Mt then
4: Md = getDecoys(M, ζ)
5: for mj ∈M do
6: if mj ∈ Md ∧ checkCon(mi,mj) == false
then
7: emi,mj = 1 . Add an edge
8: c = c+ 1
9: end if
10: end for
11: for mk ∈ mi.con do
12: if mk ∈Md ∧mk /∈Mdt then
13: emi,mk = 0 . Remove an edge
14: c = c+ 1
15: end if
16: end for
17: end if
18: end for
19: DicM = traverseNet(M)
20: for mi ∈M do
21: if mi ∈ Min(DicM ) then
22: for mj ∈M do
23: if mj ∈ Max(DicM ) ∧mj /∈ mi.con then
24: emi,mj = 1 . Add an edge
25: c = c+ 1
26: end if
27: end for
28: end if
29: end for
30: end procedure
line 19: In the second step, we first compute a dictionary
with each real IoT node as the key and number of decoy
paths as the item.
line 20: Go through each node in the network.
line 21: Check whether node mi has minimum number
of decoy paths.
line 22: Go through each node in the network.
line 23: Check two conditions: (i) whether node mj has
the maximum number of decoy paths or not; and (ii) the
node is connected with mi or not.
lines 24-25: Add an edge (connection) from mi to mj
and increment the cost by 1.
